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College Sports and the Antitrust 
Analysis of Mystique 
Sherman J. Clark∗ 
Abstract 
In this response to Marc Edelman’s Article, The District 
Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, 
and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2319 (2014), I highlight a set of conceptual issues that must be 
confronted if courts are to craft a coherent and stable body of law 
governing the NCAA’s treatment of student-athletes. First, the 
value of the product at issue here—college sports—is intimately 
connected with the nature of the labor used to create it. Second, 
the nature of that value is amorphous, contingent, and greater 
than the sum of its parts. Third, the fairness arguments that drive 
much of the litigation in this area are based on tenuous 
assumptions about the relationship between the labor used to 
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I have been asked to respond to Marc Edelman’s Article1 
describing and commenting on the case of O’Bannon v. NCAA.2 It 
is difficult to keep on top of the details of this ongoing litigation 
while retaining a sense of perspective, and Edelman is among 
just a handful of scholars who have been able to do so. Although I 
do not agree fully with Edelman’s conclusions—particularly 
regarding the connection between antitrust and Title IX,3 the 
Article is a clear, accurate, and thoughtful description of the case. 
By way of response, therefore, rather than march step by step 
through the ground Edelman has so ably covered, I would like to 
take this opportunity to highlight a set of conceptual difficulties 
underlying this and related litigation—difficulties with which I 
believe that neither Edelman nor the courts have sufficiently 
come to terms. 
The difficulties, all interconnected, are these. First, the value 
of the product at issue here—college sports—is intimately 
connected with the nature of the labor used to create it. Second, 
the nature of that value is amorphous, contingent, and greater 
than the sum of its parts. Third, the fairness arguments that 
motivate or at least inform litigation of this sort are arguably 
based on tenuous assumptions about the relationship between 
the labor used to create the product and the value of the product. 
In this brief Essay, I do not try to resolve these issues, although I 
do hope to offer some useful perspective. Rather, my aim is to 
bring to the fore a set of concerns that courts and commentators 
ought to acknowledge and address. 
Litigating parties, given their particular litigation goals and 
strategic thinking, might not be inclined to address these issues 
at the necessary level of generality or with the requisite depth. 
                                                                                                     
 1. Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete 
Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319 
(2014). 
 2. No. C-09-3329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014). 
 3. Edelman has, I believe, underestimated the Title IX compliance 
problems a school would generate for itself should it choose to take advantage of 
the freedom to offer men’s football and basketball players a share of licensing 
revenues. While an analysis of that issue is beyond the scope of this Essay, there 
is no rule allowing schools to treat male athletes better than female athletes 
merely because the male athletes play the sports that earn the money used to 
afford the better treatment.  
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But we need not second-guess the parties’ reasons for framing the 
issues as they do in order to recognize that the courts can and 
should look to the bigger picture. It will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to develop a coherent body of law in this area unless 
courts come to terms with the deeper conceptual problems 
inherent in the application of antitrust law to the National 
College Athletic Association’s (NCAA) treatment of student-
athletes. This will not be easy. However, the challenge presented 
by these cases is also an opportunity. Situations like this—in 
which the law as familiarly understood does not fit easily—
facilitate, indeed force, us to rethink and deepen our familiar 
understandings. If the courts can confront the conceptual 
problems presented by these cases, the result may not only be a 
more coherent body of law governing the antitrust status of the 
NCAA, but also a deeper understanding of both antitrust law and 
the unique American institution of big-time college sports. 
By way of background, as Edelman describes, § 1 of the 
Sherman Act does not prohibit every “contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade,” but bars only 
unreasonable restraints of trade.4 An unreasonable, and thus 
illegal, restraint is one that is anticompetitive in its net effect.5  
Restraints that allow the creation of a product that would not 
exist otherwise are for that reason not anticompetitive in effect, 
and thus not unreasonable.6 This is true even if the restraints in 
question are of a sort that in other contexts might be 
anticompetitive. So, beneath the doctrinal complexity, the 
essential question for the courts is this: are the restraints 
imposed by the NCAA necessary to create and maintain this 
product? This question, difficult and complex in any context, is 
particularly problematic in the context of college sports for at 
least two reasons. 
                                                                                                     
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 5. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) 
(noting that “[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, 
restrains” and that restraints are only illegal when they are so anticompetitive 
as to “suppress or even destroy competition”). 
 6. See Thomas A. Pirano, Jr., Identifying Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct 
Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 827 (2000) (“The Sherman Act 
encouraged firms to compete aggressively by . . . developing new products . . . .”). 
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First, the restraints that the NCAA has imposed are 
restraints on the nature of the labor used to create the product.  
NCAA members conspire to ensure that the product they 
collectively produce—college sports—is created by a particular 
form of low-cost labor—amateur student-athletes. Such restraints 
would in most cases violate the Sherman Act. As a general rule, 
antitrust defendants cannot justify restraints in a labor market 
by pointing to procompetitive effects in a separate product 
market.7 A group of manufacturing firms could not, for example, 
justify cooperative wage-fixing on the theory that it helps them 
make products more cheaply and thus compete more effectively 
against the manufacturers of other, similar products. Indeed, key 
antitrust opinions from a generation ago can be read as simply 
applying this principle to sports, suggesting that labor restraints 
in sports can never be justified on the grounds that they help the 
league compete better against other forms of entertainment.8  
Recent opinions, however, including that of the United States 
Supreme Court in American Needle, Inc. v. NFL,9 have recognized 
that sports are different.10 These opinions have suggested that 
the anticompetitive effects of some labor restraints imposed by 
professional sports leagues should be balanced against the 
procompetitive effects of those restraints in a “closely related” 
product market.11 This principle has not been well or coherently 
worked out by the courts, so it remains unclear what sorts of 
restraints might be justified by what sorts of procompetitive 
effects. In part, the lack of coherence and predictability in this 
area stems from the failure of courts to get to the heart of the 
                                                                                                     
 7. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (noting 
the negative consequences of allowing anticompetitive effects in one market to 
be justified by precompetitive consequences in another). 
 8. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183–89 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (rejecting claims by the National Football League that the draft—a 
restraint on trade—was “procompetitive” in that it created greater parity 
between teams, which in turn led to more even and entertaining games). 
 9. 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 10. See, e.g., Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1120–24 
(E.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing antitrust issues as they related to the Senior PGA 
Tour, now known as the Champions Tour).  
 11. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203 (stating that the Court recognizes 
competitive balance as a legitimate interest (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984))).  
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matter. In particular, they have not made clear what sort of 
connection there should be between the labor and product 
markets in order to render appropriate the balancing of effects in 
the two.  
Properly understood, the relevant question ought not simply 
be the closeness of the connection between the labor and product 
markets but rather the nature of that connection. At a minimum, 
a labor restraint should be considered sufficiently connected to 
the product market to justify the balancing of effects if the 
restraint is crucial to the creation of a product that would not 
exist otherwise. Recognizing this allows us to see that the 
principle that should guide this inquiry is one that applies more 
broadly, and with which antitrust courts do in fact have some 
experience. In the seminal case of Broadcast Music v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System,12 for example, the Court recognized that an 
arrangement, which on its face appeared to be price-fixing, might 
yet be procompetitive because it made possible a product—
blanket licenses allowing for the performance of a wide range of 
copyrighted works—that would not be possible otherwise.13 So, 
the essential question is not a new one. Rather, it is a matter of 
applying the principle to labor restraints. Do the restraints make 
possible the product? 
In the context of sports leagues, there are two sorts of ways 
in which a labor restraint might be essential to the creation of the 
product. First, it might be necessary or important that the labor 
be distributed in a particular way—presumably with some degree 
of evenness. This idea is at the heart of all the competitive 
balance arguments made by cooperative sports enterprises in 
support of labor restriction. These arguments are tenuous, 
however, and often fail to justify restraints. It can appear that 
the organization making the argument has confused or conflated 
increased competition on the field with the increased economic 
competition that must be shown in order to justify an otherwise 
anticompetitive restraint. Thus, it can appear as though the 
enterprise is simply arguing that the restraints allow it to make 
                                                                                                     
 12. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 13. See id. at 24 (ruling that this case was not an instance of price fixing 
because the blanket license did not mask anything). 
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better products—an argument that is of course foreclosed by 
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.14  
The NCAA falls into this trap whenever it makes arguments 
about competitive balance and the like. Such arguments not only 
fail to justify the restraints in question, but they fail to highlight 
the crucial difference between college and professional sports, 
and thus obscure the underlying issues that most need to be 
illuminated. 
In the context of college sports, the nature of the relationship 
between the labor and product is qualitatively different because 
the nature of the labor used to create the product is arguably 
essential to the nature and value of the product in a way not 
found in other contexts, including most professional sports. It is 
not simply the case that allowing defendants to collude in a labor 
market will allow them to produce better products. Rather, this is 
a situation—rare if not unique—in which the restrained nature of 
the labor market is the product. They are selling not just football 
and basketball games, but football and basketball games played 
by a certain sort of player. 
A partial analogy might be to a firm selling furniture made 
by Amish craftsmen, marketing to people who admire and want 
to support the Amish lifestyle and who cherish the thought of 
sitting on furniture made by the people they so admire. Such a 
firm could certainly decide to employ or contract with only Amish 
furniture makers. The analogy is only partial, however, because 
such a firm could simply unilaterally decide to hire or contract 
with Amish craftsmen. The analogy fails to capture the necessity 
for cooperation which is at the heart of the difficulty in the 
context of college sports. There are few, if any, contexts other 
than college sports in which the nature of the labor is somehow 
inherent in the value of the product and where that particular 
form of labor, and thus that product, can be secured only through 
cooperation. 
The precedent most closely on point might be a 2002 case 
involving the senior golf tour, Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc.15 There, 
                                                                                                     
 14. 435 U.S. 679, 693–95 (1978) (enjoining a restraint designed to protect 
against subpar engineering because of “the legislative judgment that ultimately 
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and 
services”). 
 15. 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
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the tour members agreed among themselves to manage entry into 
tournaments in ways that favored famous over-50 golfers, and 
thus limited the participation of some more skilled but less well-
known golfers.16 The basic logic of the case was that the product 
offered by the senior tour was not just golf tournaments, or even 
golf tournaments for older players. Rather, the tour was to a 
large extent an old-timers event, appealing to fans’ memories of 
their favorite players’ former exploits.17 It was thus permissible to 
limit entry to players with former exploits for fans to remember.18  
The court held that the restraints were not anticompetitive 
in economic effect, and opined: “Even if Toscano had provided 
evidence of significant anticompetitive effects, the defendants 
have amply demonstrated that the eligibility rules have a series 
of procompetitive justifications. The eligibility rules provide a 
product that otherwise would not exist and, therefore, they 
further consumer welfare.”19 Labor could be restrained because it 
was the nature of the labor that made the product what it was.20  
Framing the issue in this way makes clear that in the context 
of college sports some restraints on labor must be necessary. If we 
want this product—games played by a certain sort of player—to 
exist, those producing it must be able to require that the games 
be played by that sort of player. And if cooperation is necessary to 
that end, then they must be permitted to cooperate. This does 
not, however, answer the more difficult question. Which 
restraints are truly necessary? What exactly makes a player the 
sort of player that people are willing to pay to see play? 
This highlights the second and more fundamental difficulty 
inherent in these cases. The nature of the product—its value, its 
appeal, and its connection to the labor used to create it—is 
amorphous and difficult to pin down. That, in turn, makes it very 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 1112. 
 17. See id. at 1113 (“The Tour provides an entertainment product in which 
primarily well known and popular senior golfers may compete against one 
another.”). 
 18. See id. at 1126 (explaining that the restrictions on tournament entry 
were not unreasonable). 
 19. Id. at 1123. 
 20. See id. at 1126 (explaining that restraining the type of player to enter 
this tournament was acceptable because it was a part of the business model). 
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difficult to determine which of its features are essential to its 
creation and ongoing value. 
What makes college sports valuable and appealing? At one 
level, college football and basketball are merely lower-level 
versions of games that are played at a much higher level by 
professional athletes. But if that were all they were, they would 
not be so popular and they would not be worth much money. 
Consider how few people watch NBA Development League 
games, which are played at a similar (if not higher) level than are 
college basketball games.21 Or think about how few people are 
interested in lower-level football leagues, which rarely last more 
than a few years, and which never make money.22 
So, why do millions of people watch college football and 
basketball? What is it that makes this product so much more 
appealing than seemingly similar, semi-professional sports? No 
one knows for sure. It is clearly some combination of tradition, 
amateurism, mythology, community spirit, nostalgia, idealism, 
and other intangible qualities. It would not be too much to 
describe it as a mystique. 
Antitrust courts do not have much experience with the 
analysis of mystique. They have proven unwilling to wrestle with 
the question of how the various facets of college sports come 
together to produce the product capable of generating such 
revenue. Instead, courts tend to assess restraints serially, as they 
are challenged, in a way that makes it difficult to assess what the 
essential components are—and hard for the NCAA ever to prove 
                                                                                                     
 21. Compare NBA D-League Achieves Record-Breaking Growth During 
2013-14 Season, NBA.COM (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.nba.com/dleague/news/nba_development_league_record_breaking_gr
owth_2014_05_01.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (stating that the total 
attendance for all teams in the 2013–14 NBA D-League season was 1,181,404) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), with 2014 NATIONAL 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2014 NCAA MEN’S BASKETBALL ATTENDANCE 
(2014), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/m_basketball_RB/Reports/attend/2014.pdf 
(providing that the University of North Carolina alone had a home basketball 
attendance of 324,458 in the 2013–14 season).   
 22. See, e.g., Steve Johnson, Tuesday-Morning Quarterbacking the Demise 
of the XFL, CHI. TRIB. (May 15, 2001), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-
05-15/features/0105140260_1_vince-mcmahon-xfl-rival-networks (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2014) (discussing the failure of the XFL, a professional football league 
designed to emphasize entertainment) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
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that any particular change will be the straw that breaks the 
camel’s back.  
The process began three decades ago in NCAA v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma & University of Georgia 
Athletic Association;23 but only Justice White, dissenting in that 
case, seemed to see the slippery slope for what it was.24 The case 
involved a set of agreements to limit television broadcasts of 
college football games; when taken together, those agreements 
limited output and fixed the prices of television broadcast of 
games.25 The court recognized this and rejected the NCAA’s 
efforts to argue that the agreements were in various ways 
procompetitive.26 Justice White, in dissent, disagreed with the 
court’s analysis on several particular points, but his key concern 
seemed to be less about the reasoning in the case than about the 
consequences of the ruling.27  
The majority in Board of Regents seemed to assume that the 
ruling would leave untouched the ability of NCAA members 
legally to agree on such things as eligibility and amateurism 
requirements, which the court saw as necessary to preserve the 
nature of the product: “In order to preserve the character and 
quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be 
required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the 
‘product’ cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement.”28 But 
Justice White realized that once antitrust scrutiny was applied to 
the NCAA, even as to something so seemingly far removed from 
the NCAA’s central mission as TV contracts, subsequent 
                                                                                                     
 23. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 24. See id. at 135–36 (White, J., dissenting) (“The collateral consequences 
of the spreading of regional and national appearances among a number of 
schools are many.”).  
 25. See id. at 94 (majority opinion) (explaining that “[n]o member is 
permitted to make any sale of television rights except in accordance with the 
basic plan”). 
 26. See id. at 120 (“[C]onsistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the 
NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that 
restrict output are hardly consistent with this role.”). 
 27. See id. at 128 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that “unlimited 
appearances by a few schools would inevitably give them an insuperable 
advantage over all others and in the end defeat any efforts to maintain a system 
of athletic competition among amateurs who measure up to college scholastic 
requirements”). 
 28. Id. at 102 (majority opinion). 
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challenges would call into question aspects of NCAA regulation 
more central to the continued survival of college sports.29  
The Seventh Circuit attempted to forestall this consequence 
in Banks v. NCAA,30 a case challenging an NCAA rule prohibiting 
players from hiring agents.31 The court recognized that if that 
particular student-athlete eligibility requirement were made 
subject to antitrust scrutiny, it would be difficult or impossible to 
make principled determinations about which requirements are 
truly necessary to maintain the “character and quality” of college 
sports.32 So the court simply asserted, without much analysis, 
that there was no anticompetitive impact on any labor market, 
that NCAA members were “purchasers of labor” in their 
relationships with student-athletes, and that there was therefore 
no antitrust violation.33 But judicial fiat was not sufficient to stop 
a slide down a slope this slippery. 
The next step was Law v. NCAA,34 in which the Tenth 
Circuit held that the NCAA was subject to antitrust scrutiny not 
only when its members were acting as sellers of a product but 
also as employers—in that case employers of coaches.35 
Accordingly, anticompetitive restraints in that labor market also 
violated the Sherman Act.36 Still, the court seemed to assume, as 
did the NCAA, that this would not implicate student-athlete 
eligibility requirements.37 Again, there was no warrant for that 
                                                                                                     
 29. See id. at 134 (White, J., dissenting) (“The legitimate noneconomic 
goals of colleges and universities should not be ignored in analyzing restraints 
imposed by associations of such institutions on their members.”). 
 30. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 31. See id. at 1083 (describing a situation in which a player was denied 
reinstatement by the NCAA after entering the NFL draft). 
 32. Id. at 1089 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)). 
 33. Id. at 1095. 
 34. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 35. See id. at 1023 (describing the NCAA as failing to meet its burden of 
showing that “the procompetitive justifications for a restraint on trade outweigh 
its anticompetitive effects”).  
 36. See id. at 1016 (“To prevail on a section 1 claim under the Sherman Act, 
the coaches needed to prove that the NCAA (1) participated in an agreement 
that (2) unreasonably restrained trade in the relevant market.”). 
 37. See id. at 1021 (“In Board of Regents the Supreme Court recognized 
that certain horizontal restraints, such as the conditions of the contest and the 
eligibility of participants, are justifiable under the antitrust laws because they 
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assumption. Once the NCAA was subject to antitrust scrutiny as 
an employer, it was inevitable that student-athlete eligibility 
requirements would be called into question. And they were.  
So here we are. The District Court in O’Bannon has held that 
there is no evidence that payments to college athletes of less than 
$20,000 would harm consumer demand for college sports.38 That 
is probably right. But if so, why not payments of $30,000? Or 
$50,000? Any line will be inherently arbitrary and unstable. 
Nor is it hard to predict the next step—an antitrust 
challenge to academic-eligibility requirements. The O’Bannon 
court seems to assume that its ruling does not implicate NCAA 
rules requiring athletes to be full-time students; and on its face it 
does not. But the logic is inexorable. Is it truly essential to the 
character of college sports that players be full-time students? 
Would it really destroy the product if schools were permitted to 
allow part-time students to participate? Indeed, why require 
schools to require that players be students at all? It may seem 
obvious that academic-eligibility requirements are different—
that, of course, schools must be permitted to agree on such 
matters. But to make that assumption would be to show the same 
lack of foresight and imagination evinced by the Supreme Court 
in Board of Regents and by the Tenth Circuit in Law.  
Of course, courts could simply draw a line by fiat—declare 
that academic-eligibility requirements are not illegal; but again, 
the line will be arbitrary and the cases unpredictable. The 
essential problem is that it will be difficult or impossible for the 
NCAA to show that any one particular thing about who plays 
college sports is by itself essential. It is very hard to define the 
essential components of a mystique, and it will be impossible to 
do so as long as the components are addressed one by one as they 
arise in isolated cases challenged in litigation. Instead, if there is 
to be a coherent and stable body of law in this area, it will require 
that courts and commentators, aided perhaps by thoughtful 
economists and social scientists, look to the big picture and help 
                                                                                                     
are necessary to create the product of competitive college sports.”). 
 38. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C-09-3329-CW, 
2014 WL 3899815, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (“[T]he Court does not find 
these findings to be credible evidence that consumer demand for the NCAA’s 
product would decrease if student-athletes were permitted to receive 
compensations.”). 
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us figure this out. And, if it turns out that it is simply not 
possible for antitrust courts to figure out or articulate coherently 
which components of college sports are essential to preserving its 
value, and we nonetheless want that value preserved, we should 
consider a statutory exemption that would shield some portion of 
the enterprise from antitrust scrutiny. 
Recognizing the amorphous nature of this product also sheds 
light on the fairness and exploitation arguments that accompany, 
if not motivate, much of this litigation. It is seen as unfair for 
colleges to make so much money when it is in some sense the 
players who are bringing in the money. But are they? Recall that 
what the players do—play lower-level versions of professional 
sports—would not be, and in fact is not, of interest or value 
outside of the unique context of college sports. The product—the 
thing that commands attention and thus generates the revenue—
is in fact the amorphous mystique described above, which is 
generated and maintained by a larger set of institutions and 
traditions and practices of which any given player is just one 
inessential part. As to most players, to say that he deserves a cut 
because he brings in the money is analogous to saying that the 
driver of an armored car bringing deposits to a bank deserves a 
cut because he is the one bringing in the money.  
Individual players seem to be, and feel that they are, 
particularly valuable because so much effort is spent on 
recruiting them. No one competes for armored car drivers. But 
here is what gets missed. The value of particular players, even 
most particularly talented players, is distributional rather than 
value producing. The allocation of talent impacts who wins more 
games, and, thus, which schools get a larger share of the revenue 
produced by the collective enterprise—through bowl game 
appearances, tournament bonuses, larger shares of broadcasting 
revenue, and the like. But the overall appeal and value of college 
sports does not depend on who wins games or on how the overall 
revenue is distributed among schools. Indeed, if there is any 
merit to the competitive-balance arguments made by the NCAA, 
particularly talented players may actually undercut the value of 
the enterprise. 
Consider, by way of analogy, if NASCAR were to allow race 
teams to use different tires, and if the best tires were in short 
supply. Teams would spend tremendous money and energy 
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choosing and competing for better tires because slightly better 
tires can mean the difference in any given race. But it would be a 
mistake to conclude that having the best possible tires is crucial 
to the popularity and appeal of the collective endeavor. It is not. 
Indeed, NASCAR recognizes this and standardizes tires, 
discouraging collective expenditure on aspects of the sport with 
merely distributional rather than value-enhancing effects.39 
Because the appeal of college sports is based not on the absolute 
level of play, but on the mix of mystique and tradition described 
above, most players are like tires. Their particular talents may be 
distributionally important—thus, the effort spent recruiting 
them; but as to the overall value of the sport, they just need to be 
good enough and relatively evenly distributed. 
I say “most players” because there are certainly rare and 
special players whose particular talents or personalities 
contribute to the overall appeal of, and, thus, the revenue 
generated by, college sports as a whole. The “Fab Five” at 
Michigan were an example—as, more recently, was “Johnny 
Football” at Texas A&M. Fairness suggests that such players 
share in the revenue that they as individuals help generate—or 
at least that they should be permitted to earn income in ways 
that do not undercut the viability of the larger endeavor through 
which they have that very earning capacity.  
It would be difficult or impossible to determine which players 
have this individual impact on the appeal of college sports, and to 
what extent. However, simply recognizing the difficulty and 
significance of this question is important in evaluating the 
fairness arguments underpinning much of this litigation. The 
recognition suggests a potential, if partial, solution to the line-
drawing problems faced by the courts: allow players to do paid 
third-party endorsements. Given a case providing the appropriate 
platform, the courts could rule that it is unnecessarily 
anticompetitive, and thus illegal, for the NCAA to collude to 
                                                                                                     
 39. I do not mean to suggest that the tire-restriction cases are on point as a 
matter of substantive antitrust law. Unlike the situation with student-athletes, 
there is no sense in which the particular nature of the tires is essential to the 
overall value of the sport. Thus, the legality of race-car tire restrictions hinges 
essentially on competitive-balance arguments, which arguments, as noted, are 
not at the heart of the NCAA’s best defense.  
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preclude member schools from allowing players to make 
commercials or sign memorabilia. 
The district court in O’Bannon seems to have rejected this 
option, opining that “[a]llowing student-athletes to endorse 
commercial products would undermine the efforts of both the 
NCAA and its member schools to protect against the ‘commercial 
exploitation’ of student-athletes.”40 As Edelman notes, however, 
the court seems to have had little or no basis for this assertion.41 
In fact, it is not at all clear that allowing student-athletes to do 
endorsements would cause undue difficulties. Moreover, such a 
ruling would provide a less arbitrary line. Schools would not be 
paying players at all, so courts would not be faced with the 
slippery slope of how much is too much. 
Note also that the plaintiffs in O’Bannon did not seek such a 
remedy.42 And why not? Because there would be very little money 
to be made by most players through third-party endorsements. 
And why is that? Because most players are not, as individuals, 
the source of much of the interest generated by sports. What the 
plaintiffs would no doubt describe as the inadequacy of the 
remedy is itself evidence that the fairness logic underlying their 
claims is less strong than we might be inclined to believe. 
This would, as I say, be just a partial solution because at 
least some high-profile players no doubt contribute to the overall 
appeal of not only their sport, but also their NCAA member 
schools. In addition to being permitted to do endorsements, the 
Fab Five or Johnny Football might with some justice claim to 
have been entitled to a share of the marketing and licensing 
revenue generated by Michigan, by Texas A&M, and by the 
NCAA as a whole—at least to the extent that that revenue had 
been augmented by the particular popularity of those players.  
                                                                                                     
 40. O’Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *47. 
 41. See Edelman, supra note 1, at 2336 (noting that “much evidence at trial 
indicated that the NCAA itself does not always act in a manner to protect such 
exploitation”). 
 42. See O’Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *1 (explaining that the plaintiffs 
only sought the right to receive “a share of the revenue that the NCAA and its 
member schools earn from the sale of licenses to use the student-athletes’ 
names, images, and likeness in videogames, live game telecasts, and other 
footage”). 
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Still, although not a complete solution, allowing players to do 
endorsements would at least do three things. It would solve some 
of the fairness and exploitation problems. It would clarify the 
(limited) extent to which most players are in fact bringing in the 
money so as to deserve a cut. And it would provide a (relatively) 
stable stopping point on the slippery slope from Board of Regents 
to the end of big-time college sports.43 
 
                                                                                                     
 43. In addition, it would not violate Title IX for schools simply to allow all 
players—male and female—to engage in a reasonable amount of third-party 
endorsements. 
